The Servian nation thus connected itself most intimately with Russia

He had no doubt received the assurance that, in any peace which might be concluded, the affairs of Servia should not be neglected. Nothing could be more advantageous to the country than that its relations should be established in a treaty of peace between the two powers. This was the very guarantee the state required. The Servian nation thus connected itself most intimately with Russia; and must consequently participate in the perils and ^misfortunes, as well as in the success and pros  J? perity, of that empire.

Russia was now about to enter upon a war more perilous than any in which it had ever been engaged. The good understanding which had existed between that country and France, since the treaty arranged at Tilsit, and confirmed at Erfurt, had gradually diminished since 1810; and it became apparent to all Europe, that open war must ensue between the two empires. Soon afterwards an army such as Europe had never yet seen, was set in motion against Russia: under a general who must ever maintain his rank as one of the greatest military commanders of all ages.

A fierce struggle was impending over Russia: not merely for a trivial loss or gain : but such a decisive conflict as other nations had already sustained; involving her political existence: nay, indeed, the very life of the nation.

Napoleon’s object   in which he had succeeded with the German powers was now to prevail upon the Ottomans to involve themselves with him in this contest; and, as^the„Turks were already at war with Russia, his project seemed easy of accompli slnnent. In his treaty with Austria, Napoleon again acknowledged the integrity of. the Ottoman empirej and a secret article of that treaty stipulated that Turkey should be invited to join in the alliance against Russia. He flattered himself that, by pro

mising to the Ottomans the re conquest of the Crimea, he should induce them to take part in the war, and aid him with all their resources ; so that in a short time 100,000 Turks would overrun the interior of Russia. On the part of the French, it has always been asserted that Napoleon had too long delayed to make decisive proposals of this nature at Constantinople. His minister of foreign affairs asserted, in February, 1812, that the French ambassador there was doing nothing against the interest of Russia ; and an historian, who has seen many secret documents, declares that this was only too true, and that the ambassador was at that time ordered to maintain a strict reserve on the subject.

Perhaps it might be that Napoleon considered his proposals irresistible, at whatever time he might choose to make them; on account of the great oppor tunity which they afforded the Turks for re establishing their power. At the moment when lie opened the campaign of 1812 in earnest, he was by no means deficient in pressing invitations or in brilliant promises.